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                The European Model Company Law Act Project 
 
                   Theodor Baums / Paul Krüger Andersen
* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On 27 and 28 September 2007, a commission formed on the initiative of the authors
1  
held its first meeting in Aarhus, Denmark to deliberate on its goal of drafting a "European 
Model Company Law Act" (EMCLA). This project, outlined in the following pages, aims 
neither to force a mandatory harmonization of national company law nor to create a further, 
European corporate form.  The goal is rather to draft model rules for a corporation that 
national legislatures would be free to adopt in whole or in part. Thus, the project is thought as 
an alternative and supplement to the existing EU instruments for the convergence of company 
law. The present EU  instruments, their prerequisites and limits  will be discussed in  more 
detail in Part II, below. Part III will examine the US experience with such "model acts" in the 
area of company law.  Part IV will then conclude by discussing several topics concerning the 
content of an EMCLA, introducing the members of the EMCLA Working Group, and 
explaining the Group's preliminary working plan. 
 
 
                                                 
*             Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums, Institute for Law and Finance, J.W. Goethe - Universität, Frankfurt/Main, 
Germany; Prof. Dr. Paul Krüger Andersen, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus, Denmark. 
1     See P. Krüger Andersen, 'Regulation or Deregulation in European Company Law – a Challenge,' in U. 
Bernitz, ed., Modern Company Law for a European Economy – Ways and Means, 2006, p. 263 et seq.; T. 
Baums, 'The law of corporate finance in Europe – an essay', in: Nordic Company Law, 2008 p. 31 et seq.; 
also see Ebke's earlier proposal to set up a "European Law Institute" modeled on the American Law Institute 
in order to draft a European Model Company Law Statute. W. Ebke, 'Unternehmensrechtsangleichung in der 
Europäischen Union,' in Festschrift für B. Großfeld, 1998, p. 189, 212 et seq., and J. Wouters, 'European 
Company Law: Quo Vadis?', Common Market Law Review 37, 2000, 257-307, especially p. 298.   
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II. European company law legislation: traditional instruments and a new tool 
 
1.  The limits of European company law legislation 
 
Until now, the European Union has employed three tools to ensure that the legal rules in 
the area of company law are compatible with the goal of a functioning internal market: first, 
the harmonization of national company law through directives adopted under art. 44(2)(g) 
Treaty  Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)  that national legislatures must 
implement; second, the creation of new supranational organizational forms on the basis of 
art. 308 EU Treaty, forms which exist alongside  their  national  counterparts as alternative 
vehicles for companies; and third, the judicial policing of national company law under the 
right of free establishment (arts. 43 and 48 EC Treaty) as performed by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), which in a  series of landmark decisions since 1999 - among them the well-
known  Centros,  Überseering and  Inspire A r t  cases  -  has rejected a number of national 
limitations and thus triggered a "regulatory competition" among national corporate laws, the 
results of which are not yet foreseeable. 
Each of these methods of structuring the law has its own prerequisites and conditions of 
application  – which here will be mentioned only summarily
2  – that make supplementation 
through a uniform, albeit non-mandatory, European Model Company Law Act  both 
meaningful and desirable.  
Harmonization by means of directives is understood as a technique for achieving less 
than full unity of law and is subject to the Treaty condition that the measure be implemented 
only if and to the extent required for reaching the goal of a common market (arts. 3(1)(h) and 
44(2)(g) EC Treaty). This approximation of laws presupposes the existence of a variety of 
individual national legal systems that will continue to exist, and also of diverse, possible legal 
solutions. As a form of "harmonization lite," it seeks merely to ensure that each member state 
enacts provisions that do not disrupt the internal market.  Beyond that floor, each member 
state remains free to shape its company law in any way it chooses, p rovided the result 
                                                 
2     See the detailed discussion by C. Teichmann, Binnenmarktkonformes Gesellschaftsrecht, 2006, pp. 73 
et seq., and e.g. K. Engsig Sørensen/P. Runge Nielsen, EU-retten, 2004, pp. 675 et seq.  
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conforms to the minimum needs of the Union.  Although this solution effectively allows the 
use of "states as laboratories" to develop competing corporate models
3 and helps counteract a 
petrification of a status quo reached by centrally d eveloped norms,
4 beyond the minimally 
harmonized area a basic tension remains with the expectations of corporations operating on a 
European scale, which rather ask for standardization of operating rules and seek uniformity in 
laws on investor protection and the disclosure of information, so as to reduce their 
information and transaction costs. 
Supranational organizational forms like the European Company (SE), the European 
Co-operative (ECS) or the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) would only meet 
these needs if the statutes of the individual member states in which they are based had 
substantially similar content. This is a condition that the current state of affairs does not meet, 
given that the statutes creating supranational entities contain numerous references to national 
laws as gap-fillers.  In this way, the enacted company forms by no means create uniform 
rules, but rather each member state presents a different mosaic of supranational and national 
rules to the market.  In the case of the SE, above all, EU law creates a mere torso of a 
corporation. There are undisputable advantages to this type of form (e.g., combining free 
                                                 
3            For a detailed discussion of competition between legislatures, see E. M. Kieninger, Wettbewerb der 
Privatrechtsordnungen  im E uropäischen Binnenmarkt,  2002; K. Heine,  Regulierungswettbewerb im 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 2003; C. Teichmann, op. cit. n. 2, p. 330 et seq.,  J. Armour, 'Who should make Corporate 
Law?  EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition,' ILF Working Paper Series No. 41 (Nov. 2005) 
available at:  http://www.ilf-frankfurt.com/uploads/media/ILF_WP_041.pdf;  J.  Andersson, ' Competition 
between Member States as Corporate Legislator,' in U. Bernitz, ed., op. cit. n. 1,  p. 143  et seq.; H . 
Søndergård  Birkmose,  'Regulatory Competition and the European Harmonisation Process', European 
Business Law Review, 17, 2006, p. 1079-1097. The discussion on competition is particularly related to the 
European Legal Capital Regime as determined by the Second Company Law Directive. Thus, there is a 
debate on what the directive allows – is it possible for the member states to create a competitive new model 
for regulations within the framework of the directive, or is it necessary to create an alternative system? In a 
newly published contribute to that debate (P. Santella/R. Turrini, 'A contribution to the debate on the legal 
capital regime in the EU: What the Second Company Law Directive allows',  in: P. Krüger Andersen/K. 
Engsig Sørensen (eds.), Company Law and Finance, 2007, pp. 85 et seq.) the authors argue that the Second 
Company Law Directive is a very flexible instrument which to a very large extent allows member states to 
develop new and efficient capital rules. An example to illustrate this could be the new (2006) and liberal 
Finnish Company Act. See J. Makönen, 'Capital Maintenance and Distribution Rules in Modern European 
Company Law', in Company Law and Finance (op.cit.), pp. 119, and M. Airaiksinen 'The Delaware of 
Europe Financial Instruments in the new Finnish Company Act', in Company Law and Finance (op.cit.), pp. 
311. 
4           On the disadvantages of centrally developed norms (keywords: elimination of regulatory competition; 
"petrification" of the law because of the EU legislative process; costs of change)  see  C.  Teichmann, 
'Wettbewerb der Gesetzgeber im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht,' in E. Reimer et al. (eds.), Europäisches 
Gesellschafts- und Steuerrecht , 2007, pp. 313, 329 with further references.  
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structuring with a uniform "European Trademark"). However, the advantages of a  truly 
unified corporate form remain beyond reach. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible 
to develop a genuinely European company in the planned "European Private Limited 
Company" (EPC). 
Judicial policing of national company law  for conformance with the right of free 
establishment can in the final determination only clear away barriers on a case-by-case basis, 
but cannot serve to positively create workable forms. Although offending national norms are 
removed, they are not replaced with provisions serving the internal market. Rather, ECJ 
company law decisions have since 1999 launched a competition for corporate charters in 
which member states have started to adopt differing measures within the open area left by the 
ECJ.  In this respect it has been argued that  the establishment of a market for  corporate 
charters does not necessarily lead to regulatory competition as the supply-side (the member 
states) lack sufficient incentives to compete for charters.
5 The work of the Group might help 
to improve  this as  its procurement of detailed information o n national company law will 
create the transparency that is a prerequisite for competition.  
 
2.  The Present Aims of EU regulation: From Harmonization to Convergence 
 
The objectives of EU regulation in the area of company law have changed substantially 
over time – in spite of their unchanged basis in Article 44(3)(g) of the EC Treaty. In an article 
on the subject, Jan Wouters analyzed the development from the sixties (the adoption of the 
first series of directives) until the year 2000.
6 During the sixties, the ambitious goal was to 
harmonize company law, comprising all aspects of such law from the formation of companies 
to  investment, dividends, mergers and liquidations. After adoption of the first series of 
harmonization directives, this development gradually  stopped. It turned out that it was 
impossible to realize full harmonization in several areas, and the goal of harmonization was 
                                                 
5     See H. Søndergård Birkmose, 'A Race to the Bottom in the EU', Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, Vol. B, no. 1, 2006, p. 35-80. 
6     J. Wouters,  'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?',  Common Market Law Review 37, 2000, p. 257-
307.  
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subjected to debate. Wouters describes the EU’s activity in company law around the turn of 
the M illennium as characterized by a fourfold crisis: conceptually (e.g. participation versus 
consultation  of employees), in relation to competence ( i.e., an emphasis on  subsidiarity), 
questioning legitimacy (i.e., a new preference for a decentralized development of the law) and 
a growing local  loyalty (member states’ resistance to implementation of EU norms).
7 He 
argued that the Commission d id not have any coherent vision or agenda in the field of 
company law. Shortly after the publication of this article, the Commission (on 4 September 
2001) set up  a Group of Company Law Experts. This Group was due to provide 
recommendations for creating a modern framework for European company law. Based on the 
Group’s final report,
8 the Commission elaborated its Action Plan in 2003.
9 To use the words 
of Rolf Skog,
10 one might well say that EU’s work with company law 'gained new wind in the 
sails'. 
Although the initial Action Plan of 2003 has been reviewed and developed further 
meanwhile,
11 the three “guiding political criteria” that the regulatory activity at the European 
level needs to respect remain important also in the context of the Model Law Project.
12 These 
criteria are (1) the  subsidiarity and  proportionality principle of the Treaty, (2) that the 
regulatory response is flexible in application, but firm in principles, and (3) that it should 
shape international regulatory developments.  
To sum up, the present aim of the EU regulation is not to harmonize the companies acts 
of the member states. Directives are not the primary regulatory tool. Better regulation can 
include alternative tools – such as a model law that can foster convergence and best practice 
                                                 
7     J. Wouters , op. cit., p. 275.  
8     Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 4 November 2002. 
9     Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to 
Move Forward (COM(2003) 284 Final).  
10     See R. Skog, 'Harmoniseringen af bolags- og börsrätten indom EU – ny vind I seglen?', NTS (Nordisk 
Journal of Company Law), 2001, pp. 331; same, 'Harmoniseringen af bolagsrätten indom EU – fortfarende 
vind i seglen? ' NTS 2007:1, pp. 66. 
11         See T. Baums, 'European Company Law beyond the Action Plan',  European Organization Law Review 
8, 2007, pp. 143 et seq . 
12     See the Action Plan, op. cit. n. 9, at p. 4.  
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on a European level. Creating  a European Model Company Law Act is completely in line 
with this view expressed by the Commission. 
 
3.  Concluding Thoughts on the EU Company Law Program 
 
As has been shown above, today member states have a significant amount of legislative 
free space in the area of company law. This area is limited only in certain areas by the ECJ's 
decisions protecting freedom of establishment, and has been  – and will  continue to be  – 
harmonized only in certain other areas by EU directives. On the one hand, this free space 
should, i n light of the disadvantages of centrally harmonizing substantive law
13 and the 
advantages of decentralized, competing legislative efforts,
14 be retained and defended. On the 
other hand, as said, certain disadvantages are connected with relinquishing further substantive 
harmonization of national company law. Thus, the abandonment of central harmonization can 
cause three conceivable losses: first, the standardization of norms creates economic savings 
by eliminating the costs of obtaining information about diverse laws and adapting business to 
them.
15 Second,  a regulatory competition  which is  driven primarily by  the preferences  of 
managers and investors may not always lead to optimal results for the affected third-party 
constituencies.
16 Third, legislation promulgated from a central government can break through 
impediments to reform that are well-entrenched at the level of individual states. 
The potential loss of these benefits does not, however, speak unconditionally for a 
program of central harmonization. For example, it does not seem that the competition for 
corporate charters in Europe that has only just begun has injured third parties to an extent 
which would call for the prompt creation of harmonized norms for private limited companies. 
                                                 
13      See footnote 4, supra. 
14      See footnote 3, supra. 
15      See E. Kitch, 'Business Organization Law: State or Federal? – An Inquiry into the Allocation of Political 
Competence in Relation to Issues of Business Organization Law in a Federal System,' in R. M. Buxbaum et 
al. eds., European Business Law – Legal and Economic Analyses on Integration and Harmonization, 1991, 
pp. 35, 40 et seq. 
16      On this point see the literature and references in footnote 3.   
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It is also the very purpose of regulatory competition to subject to market competition those 
local particularities seen by one party as an impediment to reform while valued by the other as 
desirable options, rather than simply either eliminating or perpetuating them through 
centralized rules. However, the fact remains that a basic tension exists between the goal of a 
unified, internal market and the continued existence of different systems of corporate law, a 
tension that entails both advantages and disadvantages. Can a unified, voluntary model law 
serve to preserve the advantages of decentralized legislative energy and imagination while 
assuring most advantages of centralized harmonization? The following paragraphs consider 
this possibility. 
 
4.  The functions of an EMCLA 
 
A European Model Corporation Act
17 would not lead to a legal instrument issued by the 
European Union: the member states would neither be ordered to implement an EU directive 
nor would the Union create yet another European business form. To this extent, the concept of 
a European Model Company Law Act must not be misunderstood. Emphasis should be on the 
word model. The project is to develop a model for a companies act that the member states are 
free to adopt or reject. The content of the model should include broadly acceptable uniform 
rules, building on the common legal traditions of the member states and the existing acquis 
communautaire, but also contribute to developing best practice based on experiences from the 
modern  companies  acts  of various member states.  The draft should both leave individual 
states free space for their own take on the model, so as to account for local and n ational 
particularities, and offer incorporators maximum flexibility with which to structure the 
ultimate business enterprise.  
Of course,  even now every carefully prepared amendment of law  is preceded by a 
thorough comparative analysis. Nevertheless, such comparative analyses are often restricted 
to the most economically important jurisdictions and are often performed in a perfunctory 
                                                 
17     Regarding the type of corporations that should be regulated by the EMCLA, see infra Part IV.1.  
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way. Alone on the basis of having a member from each of the 27 EU member states,
18 the 
EMCLA drafting commission will incorporate experience from all the legal traditions found 
in the European Union within its comparative study and draft a model act that takes this 
experience into account. This should be of use not only for the smaller member states – which 
are often pressed to staff and dispatch a team of legal experts for the drafting of such 
measures  – when it comes time to consider adopting the EMCLA. In addition, it may be 
hoped that national legislatures, including those of the larger member states, will hesitate 
before evoking national particularities  in order to deviate from the European „benchmark“ 
when faced with a model act that has been specifically designed for uniform use throughout 
the Union. Lastly, a provision of national law that restricts freedom of establishment will 
likely be scrutinized even more strictly when it is not compatible with a model act that has 
been designed and adopted by all member states. 
In addition to the advantages discussed above, the development of a model companies 
act fits nicely within the current legislative plan of the European Commission, see also Part 
II.2, above. On the one hand, the Commission is currently examining the existing EU norms 
in the area of company law for possible simplification and deregulation, where this is possible 
and meaningful.
19 A model act that could replace the imperative command of a directive or 
regulation with an informed recommendation to the member states could prove a workable 
alternative to the current EU regulatory mix. On the other hand, by developing genuinely 
European forms for business organization (SE, SCE, EEIG, and,  probably, the EPC) the 
European Commission is also trying to enrich the assortment of available options for users. 
For this reason as well, the Commission sees with interest and favor the attempt to develop a 
model company form on the basis of a thorough comparative analysis that can  – unlike 
existing supranational company forms  – operate largely independently from references to 
other national laws.  The next part of this article will discuss the US experience with model 
laws. 
                                                 
18     See infra Part IV.2. 
19     See in this regard the reports by  T. Baums, op. cit. n. 11, above, and D. Weber-Rey, 'Effects of the 
Better Regulation Approach on European Company Law and Corporate Governance', European Company 
and Financial Law Review, 2007, pp. 370, 374 et seq.  
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III. Model Acts in the United States 
 
Comparative analyses often refer to the work of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in the United States
20 as an example of 
unifying law through the formulation of recommendations at a central source in spite of 
legislative competence remaining lodged with decentralized, individual states. For the 
purposes of this paper, a brief sketch of the US experience should suffice.
21 The EMCLA 
drafting commission will seek to benefit from the experience gained in the United States by 
bringing in a US legal expert as a consultant. 
US attempts to draft a corporation statute to unify the laws of the individual US states 
date back to the 1920's. The NCCUSL completed a Uniform Business Corporation Act 
(UBCA) in 1928. The UBCA was conceived as a uniform act governing all corporations, and 
was to be uniformly adopted in identical form without change by the states. However, the 
UBCA was not a success (it was adopted by only a few small states, such as  Louisiana, 
Washington, and Kentucky) and in 1943  the NCCUSL  changed  its status  into the more 
flexible form of a model act, although this did not bring about an improvement in its fortunes 
and the Act was withdrawn in 1 958.  During this period, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) had independently set out to develop its own "Model Business Corporation Act" 
(MBCA), which it released in 1946, and it eventually took over the NCCUSL's project, which 
has since that time been carried forward by the ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws of its 
Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law.
22 In contrast to the UBCA, the MBCA 
has been a great success and has been adopted by the majority of US states and has served as 
                                                 
20    For a general discussion, see K. Zweigert/H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed., 1998, 
§ 17 III; specifically on company law, R. Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law , 1993, p. 128 et 
seq.; J. von Hein, 'Competitive Company Law: Comparisons with the USA', in U. Bernitz, ed., op. cit. n. 1, p. 
25 et seq. 
21    For a more detailed discussion, see R. W. Hamilton, 'The Revised Model Business Corporation Act: 
Comment and Observation. Reflections of a Reporter', 63 Texas Law Review, 1985 pp. 1455; J. Macey, 
Macey on Corporation Laws, 2002, Introduction. 
22    See Hamilton, loc. cit. n. 21, p. 1457.  
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a resource  of  company law doctrine  for state legislatures and courts.
23 The MBCA was 
thoroughly revised in 1984, and released as the "Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA).
24  The Model Business Corporation Act is revised every year, and proposed 
revisions are published in the ABA’s Business Lawyer magazine. 
The basic entity intended to be created under the RMBCA is a publicly held 
corporation. To this end, the RMBCA is accompanied by a Model Statutory Close 
Corporation Supplement, which was first released in 1982. Beginning in the 1990's, however, 
small entrepreneurs came for tax and other reasons to favor the Limited Liability Company 
(LLC), and all of the 50 US states now have some form of LLC statute. The NCCUSL 
published a "Uniform Limited Liability Company Act" in 1995, and this model was revised in 
2006.
25  
In addition to these model acts, the American Law Institute's "Principles of Corporate 
Governance", which were first released in 1994, have great importance for company law.
26 
The Principles are not recommendations to the states for possible implementation, but rather 
restate leading judicial decisions and scholarship in the field of corporate governance, 
synthesizing best practice behavior for boards and shareholders in a form of "soft law". 
 
IV. Individual Issues 
 
This Part will discuss answers to individual questions that are currently being raised 
regarding the  EMCLA  project. The first question,  which will be  discussed in Section 1, 
                                                 
23     See R. A. Booth, 'Model Business Corporation Act – 50th Anniversary', Bus.Law. 56, 2000, 63 The 
article discusses statistics proving that the MBCA has been remarkably influential not only for state statutes, 
but also for court decisions. The Act has also been cited or discussed in numerous law review articles. See 
also J. A. Barnett et al., 'The MBCA and state corporation law – a tabular comparison of selected financial 
provisions', Bus.Law. 56, 2000, 69. In US Law schools corporate courses are usually based on the Model 
Act, often combined with, e.g., the Delaware General Corporation Law. Similar developments could arise in 
the EU with respect to EMCLA/national law. 
24     Reprinted in M .  A. Eisenberg,  Corporations and Other Business Associations.  Statutes, Rules, 
Materials, and Forms, 2007, p. 677. 
25     Reprinted in M. A. Eisenberg, op. cit. n. 16, p. 418. 
26     American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 1994.  
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regards the EMCLA's contents, i.e., the definition of the topics and areas that are currently 
expected to be regulated by the draft EMCLA.  The second question, discussed in Section 2, 
is on the  drafting commission  itself, its members,  modus operandi and relation to the 
European Commission. Lastly, the preliminary plan for drafting the Act itself will be 
discussed in Section 3. 
 
1.  The content of the EMCLA 
 
The  drafting commission will initially occupy itself with public companies limited by 
shares ( Aktiengesellschaft,  société anonyme,  società per azioni,  etc.), including listed 
companies. Private limited companies will be drawn into the project at a later date. This does 
not imply any recommendation that a unified law on business corporations, as exists in some 
member states, should be offered. 
A further question regards those areas that, through EU directives, have already largely 
been harmonized, such as the disclosure of market relevant information and capital 
contributions and maintenance. This existing harmonization and the fact that national 
legislatures may not deviate from existing directives in force speaks for the position that the 
EMCLA should not include proposals deviating from the existing  acquis communautaire. 
Exceptions may present themselves in cases where change is being discussed at the EU level, 
so that a concrete possibility would exist that member states could legally adopt EMCLA 
provisions deviating from outgoing EU law.  
The stock of norms that are grouped together under the rubric "company law" is defined 
differently in the various member states. Functional  analysis shows that a number of rules 
from tort law, civil procedure, insolvency law, securities regulation, and international private 
law (conflict of laws) can be seen as integral to company law. A convincing, conceptual 
distinction between company law and these overlapping areas can only be achieved through 
examination of the individual fact patterns addressed by the provisions, evaluation of the 
solutions currently used by member states for such situations, and formulation of the most 
appropriate, proposed boundary – irrespective of whether this rule would be considered part 
of company law in one legislation and part of, e.g., tort law or insolvency law in another.   
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A similar method or approach seems  to  recommend itself for the law of corporate 
groups. Legal issues in connection with the domination of a group of companies, information 
problems within the group, and the liability of the dominant company and its management, 
inter alia, must all be examined in the respective context. The extent to which a separate set 
of legal rules on company groups would be found advisable will then be a technical question.  
Options will have to be preserved for the seating of employee representatives on boards 
and the division of the board into management and supervisory components for those member 
states that currently have co-determination or a two-tier board structure, or may be interested 
in adopting one of these governance tools. This would not exclude the possibility of 
formulating recommendations in this area, such as with regard to the size of the supervisory 
board or the board of directors. 
 
2.  The Drafting Commission 
 
Each of the 27 EU member states is represented by a company law expert in the drafting 
commission.
27 This Commission is chaired by professor Paul Krüger Andersen of the Aarhus 
School of  Business,  University of  Aarhus, and the  Group's  secretariat is  situated  at that 
location and headed by associate professor  Hanne  Søndergård  Birkmose. The  drafting 
commission will as needed  consult experts in specialized topics for assistance as such 
questions arise. The EMCLA project is not sponsored by the European Commission, although 
the  two bodies have agreed to regular exchanges of information, and the  European 
Commission may dispatch its own people to represent it at working group meetings.  
 
 
                                                 
27     As of January 2008, the following persons comprise the Commission: Susanne Kalss (AT); Hans de 
Wulf (BE); Alexander Belohlávek (CZ); Theodor Baums (DE); Paul Krüger Andersen (DK; Chair); Juan 
Sanchez-Calero (ES); Matti Sillanpää (FI); Isabelle Urbain-Parleani (FR); Evanghelos Perakis (GR); András 
Kisfaludi (HU); Blanaid Clarke (IR); Guido Ferrarini (IT); André Prüm (LU); Harm-Jan de Kluiver (NL); 
Stanislaw Soltysinski (PL); José Engrácia Antunes (PT); Rolf Skog (SE); Maria Patakyova (SK); Paul 
Davies (UK).   
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3.  The preliminary working plan 
 
As one would expect, the work on the EMCLA will proceed in a number of individual 
stages that correspond to the individual chapters of the Act. Each member of the drafting 
commission will prepare a report on his or her national law to accompany the drafting of each 
chapter of the Act. A general reporter for each chapter will analyze the national reports and 
prepare a summary report, setting forth the various solutions and making recommendations, 
which the drafting commission will then discuss, supplement and adopt. It is expected that 
there  will  be plenary meetings  every  six months. The proposals, i.e., the recommended 
provisions with explanatory comments and references to national rules, will b e published 
chapter by chapter so that the entire academic and business community can take part in the 
process of developing the EMCLA. 
Chapters currently in progress are the rather technical provisions for the formation of 
companies (whether through incorporation or reorganization) and the central chapter on 
"directors' duties", the drafting of which is an exploration of whether a common position can 
indeed be found in this very important but hitherto un-harmonized area.  
The difficulties standing in the way of successfully completing this project are not few 
and should not be underestimated, but we do believe that the EMCLA drafting commission 
can overcome  such difficulties, and we also believe that the project will contribute  the 
efficiency and competitiveness of European business. I 
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